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The dark web is a concealed portion of the Internet that can only be accessed through specialized software. Although multiple dark
web technologies exist, with a common trait of using encryption to enforce anonymity, the Tor network remains themost prominent
dark web network. To visit websites on the network, the user must use a heavily modified Firefox browser. The use of encryption
to achieve anonymity poses a significant challenge for law enforcement that wishes to monitor users and content for illicit activity.
This study examines Tor by focusing on the network structures created between websites via hyperlinks. Examining hyperlinks
can provide insight into how virtual communities form on a network. We explore traditional social disorganization principles as a
basis to draw comparisons between these virtual communities and real-life crime-prone neighborhoods. Automated data collection
techniques were used to leverage the interconnected nature of domains on Tor. Using social network analysis, website hyperlinks
are examined and core sites are identified.The analysis shows that these core sites form a significant portion of all connectionsmade
on the network with a density of 0.132. This core serves a critical function and has implications for detecting how users connect on
Tor.
1. Introduction
The Internet has been shown to be a very powerful com-
munication tool, enabling individuals to connect globally
to access and exchange material with very few obstacles,
including governmental or jurisdictional interference. While
the Internet has been a significant driving force in the
globalization of knowledge, it has simultaneously created an
environment where nefarious users can disseminate illicit
content, connect users with similar interests, and facilitate
the proliferation of virtual illicit communities. Today, the
majority of global Internet users still only access a fraction
of the Internet, the portion known as “the surface web” [1].
As opposed to the surface web, which is open and reachable
by anyone with an Internet connection, the “dark web” uses
the infrastructure of the surface web but, through encryp-
tion, creates a subnetwork that is anonymous, concealed,
largely unindexed, and only accessible through encrypted
Internet browsers [1, 2]. A true dark web has three central
characteristics [2]: (i) it uses peer-to-peer technology rather
than centralized servers that information can be tracked back
to; (ii) it uses the infrastructure of the Internet; and (iii)
it operates through nonstandard protocols and ports. As a
result of these characteristics, the structure of the dark web
is constantly evolving. At the same time, these characteristics
can foster a potentially risky environment within which illicit
behaviors can more easily occur.
Dark webs are employed for a multitude of objectives,
including keeping Internet activities and identities anony-
mous, evading censorship, and communicating sensitive
information securely. Simultaneously, darkwebs also increase
opportunities and support for individuals conducting illicit
activities [3]. Online connections can be created instanta-
neously and those interested in pursuing malicious activities
or accessing illicit content can network with little effort
[4]. This has led to growing concerns over the extent to
which dark webs may be facilitating and fostering serious
criminal activity, as well as assisting the operations of ter-
rorists and violent extremist groups [5]. Law enforcement
and researchers have realized the need to understand the
extent of criminal activity on dark webs but have faced
three related challenges. First, the extent of criminal activity
remains unclear due to the sheer size and dynamic structure
of dark web networks. Second, research is hindered by a lack
of adequate tools and methods to examine the immensity
and evolving structure of dark webs. Finally, criminological
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theories have yet to be applied to the dark web as a means of
understanding how crime can flourish in this environment.
This study responds to these challenges by examining
dark web-based networks through the use of advanced data
collection tools and analytic methods. While many dark
web browsers exist, the Tor network remains one of the
most well-known and frequently operated networks used
to access and operate on the dark web [1] and, as such, is
well suited to provide an in-depth understanding of network
structures. Tor is a peer-to-peer network that operates by
connecting users through specialized software designed to
anonymize and encrypt data sent between those users. The
Tor network allows users to access the dark web through a
specially developed web browser. Since its inception in 2002,
Tor has become one of the most universally used dark web
technologies due to its anonymity features and its ability
to efficiently access dark web content and information [6].
AlthoughTor developersmaintain that the network’s primary
mission is to provide users with the technology to evade
intrusive surveillance and data collection by governments
and corporations while simultaneously fostering innovative
research in online anonymity and privacy, there are increas-
ing concerns about the illicit opportunities that could be
provided to malicious users.
1.1. Content on Tor. A key research interest has been the
nature of the content available on the Tor network. Con-
tent analyses have revealed that an extremely high volume
of unethical content is available through the network [5],
where unethical content was defined as negative behavior
and included “anti-social behavior, drugs, weapons, hacking,
cannibalism, bomb making, hit man services, black mar-
kets, and child pornography” [5]. Some researchers have
concluded that the prominence and pervasiveness of this
unethical content far outweigh the benefits of Tor services
[5]. However, such findings have been based exclusively
on content found on forum discussions from three main
databases, potentially limiting their generalizability [5]. Past
research has also demonstrated a varying degree of illegal
activity on the network where virtual interaction and illegal
file sharing were found to be the most prominent illegitimate
uses of dark webs such as Tor [7]. File sharing includes
sharing copyright-infringing files, such asmusic, movies, and
TV [5]. Cybercriminals also have been known to utilize the
network in order to exchange information and transfer data
for hacking, identity fraud, and buying and selling illegal
goods [8].
1.2. Malicious Uses of Tor. Tor and similar dark webs allow
users to access websites that sell illegal goods and services,
similar in functionality and structure to eBay, although car-
rying illicitmaterial.. Such sites, known as darkmarkets, carry
a variety of illegal commodities and appear to cater to users
looking for specific materials. Most of these markets require
Bitcoin as virtual trading currency. Bitcoin is an increasingly
popular peer-to-peer decentralized payment system [9]. Var-
ious types of malware have also been identified on the Tor
network. Such malware presents a highly dangerous threat to
individuals and uses ransomware to encrypt individual’s files
and prohibit access to these files until a payment is provided
[2]. It has been speculated that terrorist organizations operate
on these markets to finance their activities through the
selling of illegal weapons and drugs. This is possible for two
important reasons: first, unlike the regular Internet, these
domains are not registered to a central authority; and second,
Tor is highly anonymized, whichmeans users feel safe posting
this content.
1.3. Tor Hyperlinks. Tor websites, like those found on the
regular Internet, do not exist in a vacuum; rather, they are
hyperlinked both with themselves and to each other.Without
hyperlinks, websites could only be found if the exact URL
was known to the user. Hyperlinks thus form the basis for
how users traverse this network, connect to domains, explore
content, and connect with other users. Social network analy-
sis allows for the analysis of these hyperlinks and illuminates
website connectivity. Websites with more incoming and out-
going hyperlinks may be considered to be more popular and
more important to the dissemination of information within
the Tor network. Network analysis can help to determine not
only how information is being distributed and shared among
network structures but also the importance of particular
websites to the network. Like other Internet structures, there
may be a small dense cluster of nodes that form the center
of the network and guide the way information travels. This
would have significant implications for how the structures
of communities develop and function and could improve
strategies used by law enforcement agencies to detect and
remove illicit users and content.
In this study, we examine Tor’s hyperlink connections
through social network measures to gain insight into the
network structures that form onTor and how these structures
create conditions favorable to deviant or criminal activity. An
automated data collection tool, known as The Dark Crawler
(TDC), was employed to collect and capture a sample of
dark web content. TDC was able to navigate and collect
hyperlink information for 1,220 unique dark web websites
on the Tor network. This study also explores whether the
core principles of social disorganization theory can explain
the prevalence of “bad” communities on Tor. Traditional
social disorganization theory hypothesizes that community
structures characterized by instability, heterogeneity, and
weak social ties can foster crime and disorder [10]. We
suggest that Tor social network structures, formed through
hyperlinks, have a similar nature in that sparse and unstable
networks composed of weak connections could potentially
foster illicit online activity and content. Although no known
studies have yet to determine the time Tor domains are
online and offline, the transitivity and instability of Tor
have been widely speculated by researchers [11]. Additionally,
like crime-prone neighborhoods, networks that form on
Tor lack regulation or monitoring by law enforcement and
government. Social disorganization theory proposes that
the absence of a governing system can limit community
members’ ability to formally or informally control the behav-
ior of others and increase opportunities for individuals to
engage in criminal activities. If connections on Tor are
found to be unstable and weak, coupled with a lack of
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regulation, it is possible that these characteristics present
unique opportunities for users to leverage the network to
engage in devious activity similar to that of socially disor-
ganized communities. There is currently a void in research
that has specifically examined this link between dark web
online communities and offline communities and, as such,
the application of this criminological theory is only used
as an exploratory lens in the current study. Previous work
on Tor has examined individual websites such as The Silk
Road, an online black market, [9, 12] or as a larger con-
struct providing a content analysis of the domains found
within the network [2, 5]. Using social network analysis,
this study aims to examine (a) hyperlink connections and
the structure of website communities they form on Tor
and (b) how characteristics of these communities could
have implications for criminal activity on Tor as understood
through the lens of social disorganization theory. From a
law enforcement perspective this may have implications for
disruption strategies or target selection for policing interven-
tions.
2. Theoretical Background
Past research has examined how Internet communities cre-
ated through hyperlink connections can be understood as
individuals connecting and developing ties, thereby form-
ing small online communities within a large network [4].
These virtual communities are not constrained by geographic
barriers and have provided an avenue for users to connect
worldwide [13]. This has resulted in the development of
large, globally connected social networks that allow users
to connect with like-minded individuals, gain social sup-
port, and share information and material. Researchers have
suggested that communities that form online have a sim-
ilar nature to offline communities, where complex social
networks are formed through similar interests or purposes
and are sustained through continuous interactions among
users [7, 14]. Further, researchers have proposed that, like
the offline world, the Internet also contains “bad neigh-
borhoods” with crime distributions resembling the offline
world. These virtual neighborhoods have been considered
to have greater concentrations of crime to the extent that
they are largely composed of IP addresses hosting illicit
content or performing malicious activities. Malicious users
can also acquire criminal capital through formed connections
by sharing information and material within online criminal
communities [4]. As part of this study, we draw inspiration
from a major criminological approach to explore whether
this could be true of dark web network connections. While
parallels can be drawn between regular Internet structures
and dark web structures in how they connect websites,
they are distinct enough to warrant a separate examination
of Tor’s hyperlinking structures. That said, it is probable
that Tor is used in the same manner by malicious users.
As such, the primary assumptions of social disorganization
theory are used as basis to understand how the structure
of Tor itself, and how users connect on the network, could
potentially increase the opportunities for deviant or criminal
activity.
2.1. Social DisorganizationTheory. Many criminologists have
focused on the relationship between urban and community
organization and crime [15–17]. Social disorganization theory
specifically draws attention to the reciprocal connection
between communities and crime and has become one of the
most influential models of crime within criminology over
time. Central to the social disorganization approach is the
idea that community organization and social ties are impor-
tant mechanisms through which communities can control
crime. As such, the theory suggests urban organization can
influence patterns of crime. In particular, the research of [10]
proposed that four structural factors, instability, heterogene-
ity, weak social ties, and lack of supervision, can increase
the likelihood of crime and delinquency in a community. It
is argued that such factors disrupt the social organization
in a community, where social organization is measured by
the prevalence and interconnectedness of social networks.
As such, they theorized that weak social structures decrease
the ability of the community to maintain informal social
control over members’ behavior. Informal control in a com-
munity has been known to occur when members can control
crime through informal surveillance of the neighborhood
and intervene in problematic or suspicious activity. Strong
and cohesive social ties within community networks have,
therefore, been shown to increase the effectiveness of social
control in reducing crime because community members are
more willing to engage in monitoring and guardianship
behaviors against crime [16, 18]. Thus, the prevalence of
community organization or community disorganization are
regarded as separate traits that have an influence on crime
rates.
Social disorganization theory has generally been used
to analyze urban crime geographies where researchers have
focused on demographic, economic, social, familial, and
urban factors when assessing criminal activity. The three
variables most often assessed are those related to poverty,
ethnic heterogeneity, stability, and population mobility in a
community, as these are viewed as factors that can weaken
a community’s ability to manage the prevalence of crime
[17]. In examining and testing these factors, researchers have
found that such characteristics present in a community do
appear to have a relationshipwith increased crime rates.With
regard to the role of poverty, studies have found that commu-
nities of low socioeconomic status lack money and resource
to organize and mobilize a community [19, 20]. In a study
by [21] ethnic heterogeneity present among communities was
found to be associated with social disorganization, where the
degree of ethnic mix and population density to violent crime
was analyzed. With regard to population mobility, meaning
the rate of incoming and outgoing community members,
[17] found that residential instability had a negative effect
on network connections in a community, which in turn was
related to an increase in crime. Additionally, [22] found that
instability, measured by residents living in a community less
than 2 years, had a reciprocal relationship with community
disorder where the more instability that was present in a
community led to increased disorder, and vice versa.
Network density has also been proposed as an influential
characteristic by indicating the extent to which individuals
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are connected to each other by direct relations [17]. For
instance, high network density within a community has been
found to increase its ability to control criminal behavior as
communitymembers aremore apt tomonitor and respond to
such behavior. Alternatively, low network density and weak
social ties can result in the inability to exert social control
[17]. Social disorganization theorists have proposed that
supervision is an important component within communities
[23]. Crime and disorder can develop where there is lack of
supervision over activities and these activities are not held
in check through social control. A lack of supervision or
regulation of activities within a community can lead to higher
rates of crime,whereas cohesive communities are able to exert
control and intervene in criminal or delinquent activities.
Indeed, in studies on teenage delinquency, researchers found
that gang developed in communities when teenagers were
left unsupervised whereas more cohesive communities were
better able to collectively supervise teenagers and control
potentially delinquent behaviors [10, 17].
Overall, criminological studies of social disorganization
principle have consistently demonstrated how characteristics
of a disorganized community, sparse networks, unsuper-
vised groups, instability, and heterogeneity, are important in
explaining variation in crime rates across geographies. How-
ever, it is noted that these studies measured concepts related
to disorganization and are thus subject tomeasurement error,
with the potential that other underlying variables could be
influencing crime rates. Despite such limitations, the results
of these studies have proved to be consistent with the key
principles proposed by social disorganization theory.
Drawing on social disorganization theory, we propose
that Tor structures exhibit similar characteristics to offline
crime-prone communities. In this study, these characteristics
will be adapted in a more general sense through the results of
social network analysis and what such measures reveal about
the Tor network. Weak connectivity, low network density,
and large diversity within Tor could indicate disorganization
within these structures. Structural disorganization could be
a contributing factor to the presence of illicit activity and
material on Tor. Due to its anonymization features, Tor is
also inherently void of regulation and guardianship, which is
likely to increase or attract malicious users operating within
the network.We propose that examining hyperlink structures
is an important step to understanding Tor networks, as
hyperlinks play a crucial role in facilitating the transmission
of information and content, connecting malicious users and
websites, and providing opportunities to engage in criminal
activities.
2.2. Current Study. Examining the Tor network, how it
is deployed, and who comprises the Tor community is
an imperative undertaking to better understand the dark
web. The current research aims to achieve an in-depth
understanding of the network’s structure through the use
of innovative collection and analytic techniques. Using a
specialized web crawler enables efficient collection and the
ability to filter a vast amount of information from the Tor
network. Subsequent analysis of this information can help
determine the extent to which Tor websites are connecting
to other websites within the network through hyperlinks.
Social network analysis can assess these connections and
provide a macro-level understanding of the network struc-
tures within Tor. The social network measures serve as a
way to analyze how legitimate and illegitimate users are
able to navigate and connect on Tor. These connections are
implicit in understanding the structures within the network
and determining the impact of each website within this
dark web. This can generate insights into what content exists
within Tor and how the structures of the network may
foster online illicit activity. The overall network form will
be examined along with social network measures including
cohesion, homophily, and core-periphery to provide insight
into whether the network structures are characterized by
sparse, weak, and heterogeneous social connections between
domains.
Networks can take many forms but generally exhibit
two dichotomous structures: random or scale-free. Random
networks are composed of a disconnected set of nodes that
are paired with a certain probability [24]. These networks
often have low heterogeneity, in contrast to real world
observed networks where edge formation is likely a product
of choice [24]. Scale-free networks often follow a power-law
distribution where nodes are more likely to connect to a
central few nodes rather than forming connections to only
unique nodes [25]. New nodes in the network are more likely
to select edges to these central actors rather than follow
a random pattern. These scale-free networks characterize
the regular Internet, which may provide insight into the
connections between nodes on the dark web (Tor). Scale-
free networks may contain a central core of hubs that contain
most of the connections within the network.These hubs then
are important to how information and users traverse the
network. Identifying these hubs through a core-peripheral
model will provide insight into how a user may traverse the
network with an additional focus on how criminal activity
may proliferate within Tor. Legal domains acting as hubsmay
provide access and opportunities to illicit ones, which would
be largely isolated otherwise. The presence of a core then
reduces the distance that a user will have to travel to find illicit
content increasing criminal opportunities.
3. Data and Methods
The Dark Crawler (TDC) is a modified version of the
webcrawler presented in previous research [26–28] and is
shown in detail in Appendix. It operates by collecting and
downloading webpages into an offline database. Prior to data
collection, a list of seed websites was compiled to provide
the crawler points of departure. Seed websites are universal
resource locators (URLs) that are manually selected and can
be as few as one website or more than 1,000 websites. In the
current study, Tor domains were used as seed websites.These
Tor domains were found through a Google search of themost
widely known.onion directory called the Hidden Wiki, with
additional URLs found on Reddit and other regular Internet
sites. The Hidden Wiki categorizes and shares known Tor
domains, allowing users to search for various types of legal
and illicit content. Overall, a collection of 150 seed websites
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were identified to start the search process. These 150 websites
were selected at random using a random number generator
and through content analysis the domain was categorized
(Drugs, Child Exploitation, Directory, Hosting, Weapons,
etc.) The categories were modeled from previous studies
[2, 5] with some categories collapsed into others (guns and
hitman services were coded as weapons) while others were
expanded. Often the “Other” or “Misc.” categories were used
as a catchall for hard to identify websites and those were
disaggregated for this study into appropriate subcategories
such as politics.
Starting with the seed websites, the crawler downloaded
each top level domain and added any found hyperlinks
containing a.onion address to its internal queue. It recursively
followed these links from the queue until either no.onion
domains were found or it reached the termination criteria.
For the purposes of this study, the termination criterion was
the downloading of 1 million webpages across any number of
domains. Among the 1 million Tor webpages that comprise
the sample there were 1,220 unique domains.
3.1. Social Network Analysis
3.1.1. Homophily. Homophily looks to explain why nodes
with similar features are more likely to share social relation-
ships or ties [29]. This relationship has not been explored
through the analysis of the links between top level domains
in an online network. If domains are more likely to share
hyperlinks with similar domains, this can be compared
to homophily observed through website content. Network
topography may play a more prominent role in which
webpages hyperlink to other webpages rather than simply
connecting to webpages with similar content. This has impli-
cations about the nature of node hyperlinkages operating
within the dark web. Tor nodes are not necessarily looking
to increase visibility and might only be interested in remain-
ing part of the underground community. The presence of
homophily within the network would indicate the possibility
that websites were more likely to form connections with
similar others. Alternatively, a lack of homophily would
indicate that the network structure was not driven by homo-
geneous website connections but instead was driven by a
motley crew of users and content. If network connections are
dissimilar and diverse, this could be a contributing factor to
the presence of illicit activity onTor. As social disorganization
theory proposes, diversity within a community can lead to
higher delinquency as it interferes with members’ ability
to develop strong social connections and effectively work
together to communicate and provide surveillance within the
community [10].
3.1.2. Cohesion. A scale-free network features highly central-
ized nodes or hubs connecting to other nodes forming large
clusters [30]. Traditionally, a network that is characterized by
the small-world phenomenon has an average path length of
6 [31]. The Internet is characterized as having small-world
features despite containing an average path length of 19 [30].
This is due to the sheer size of the Internet which follows
logarithmic scaling, where the degree centralization remains
relatively high despite the sheer volume of domains present
[32]. Similar to the regular Internet, Tor will likely follow
these properties, which has important considerations regard-
ing network traversal, information flow, and law enforcement
disruption.
Given the novel nature of examining Tor through social
network analysis, examining these properties was essential
before comparing results and the generalizability of this
network to the regular Internet. If Tor does not resemble
the regular Internet, then comparing the importance of the
nodes within the network would be ill-advised. Determining
the nature of the Tor network would also allow additional
network measures to be examined on the overall network.
A core-periphery analysis was conducted to determine the
importance that some hubs might be having on the overall
network. If there was no identified core, this would indicate
that the websites were connected to each other and had a
similar number of network ties. Alternatively, the presence
of a core would suggest that the Tor network was operated
by a few centralized hubs that serve as crucial links to the
entire network. As the adoption of Tor by users remains
relatively low, accessing content on Tor can be difficult
without prior knowledge of where to look. To remedy this
problem, it is likely that central hubs have emerged which are
responsible for linking new users to onion domains. Without
hubs directing users to various domains, Tor users would
have difficulty accessing desired content. The Tor network
takes advantage of the high density of users to operate on a
peer-to-peer systemwhich increases anonymity for the entire
community. Social disorganization theory would suggest that
this anonymity within a dense network increases criminal
activity as it interferes with accountability to other Tor users.
Further, opportunities to engage in illicit activity on Tor
are not constrained by isolation. While some studies have
suggested that living in a sparsely populated area can reduce
opportunities for offending due to the offender’s distance
from targets [33], this is unlikely to impact deviant users
in the online realm. Users wishing to access or share illicit
content can do so without being constrained by geographical
barriers and likely desire to remain hidden and disconnected
on the network to avoid law enforcement.
3.2. Core-Periphery Analysis. Core-periphery analysis has
been used successfully on smaller pockets of the Internet.
Researchers hypothesize that the Internet, due to its archi-
tecture, retains an inherent core structure [34]. Although
researchers suggest that the core is formed by connections
based upon network traffic, hyperlinks serve as another way
to measure connectivity. Most of the research focusing on
online communities uses core-periphery to look at user social
relationships [35, 36], but few use websites to examine these
connections.While the existence of a core is briefly discussed
in [10], no social network analysis regarding the structure was
conducted. We propose that while a core may be present in
the network and even necessary for users to find content,
hyperlink connections outside of the core are likely to be
infrequent and weak. Tor users interested in accessing or
distributing illicit content can be expected to remain isolated
in order to avoid detection. Assuming website linkages are
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score (Corene) Website content Website type
N531 N531 0.76 Offline Offline
N514 N514 0.31 Links Directory
N1007 N1007 0.26 Wiki Hosting
N899 N899 0.20 Politics Directory
N938 N938 0.20 Politics Directory
N937 N937 0.19 Politics Directory
N898 N898 0.19 Politics Directory
N515 N515 0.16 Links Directory
Fit = 0.22 Fit = 0.07
a valid form of network construction, and the nature of the
Tor network is to be covert, then examining offline covert
networks appears to be the logical choice from which to
draw comparisons. The Tor network most closely resembles
criminal networks, where the actors are attempting to avoid
detection. The types of offline networks that share these
characteristics wouldmost likely be gang affiliation networks,
given that actors are actively trying to avoid detection and are
interested in conducting illicit activities.
Core-periphery analysis has been shown to be effective
in determining who the central actors are within numerous
networks, both offline and online [34, 37, 38]. Core-periphery
analysis can potentially reveal websites that provide highly
important positions within the network, even though they
would not appear to be influential based upon network
scores or using the naked eye. A person may appear highly
influential in a network while actually not being a central
component of the core. Some nodes that may appear as
peripheral entities actually have significance to the core of the
network and would be overlooked. Previous studies utilizing
the various forms of the TDC have discussed the biases
and limitations associated with using this data collection
technique [26]. The current sample of the Tor network relied
upon the manual data collection of seed websites through
content analysis which may influence what Tor nodes are
represented within the network [26, 28].
4. Results
The analysis of the 1,220 nodes in the Tor sample revealed
a sparse network with an average degree score of 2.27. Each
node was connected to only a couple of other websites,
showing the scale-free nature of the network. There were
2,763 ties between the nodes, leading to a network density of
0.002.This indicated that less than one percent of all possible
connections exist within the network. Websites within the
network were only connected to a few select nodes. These
ties were directed, as not all hyperlinks are reciprocated back
between websites. Of the 2,763 edges within the network
only 136 were reciprocal between nodes, while 2,627 were
not. Node reciprocity then only happened in 4.9% of all
connections within the network. The average distance of this
network was 4.95, meaning that it took, on average, about
5 connections to get from one end of the network to the
otherwhen considering all possible links between pairs of two
nodes. The surface web, on average, has an average distance
of 16–19 connections [25], suggesting that Tor exhibits a
different structure. The average score additionally suggested
that the network contained properties associated with small-
world networks. The degree centralization for the network is
41.88%, which indicated there were scale-free features present
within the network. We suggest the identification of these
sparse connections and a lack of reciprocity between the
hyperlinks contributes to the presence of crime among the
Tor community as compared to the surface web. This allows
domains to remain hidden from unwanted attention, such
as law enforcement, while still retaining the ability to attract
interested users.
4.1. Categorical versus Continuous Models. Multiple tests
were conducted using core-periphery analysis to determine
the best model fit for the dataset. The final results, reported
in Table 1, compared the categorical model and the one-
mode continuous model using the minres algorithm. The
minres algorithm is a form of factor analysis that can be
used if the diagonal values within the relational matrices
are not valued and only detect the presence or absence of
a tie [39]. The minres algorithm works best with binary
networks where the presence of a tie is captured. Model fit
is represented as a Pearson’s correlation coefficient between
the current model and an ideal model with a maximized
core structure [39]. The procedure inherently maximized
nodes with connections into one block in a matrix (the
core) while the nodes with few connections (the periphery)
were minimized and placed into a second block [39]. This
immediately biased any significance testing and thus model
fit was largely a descriptive process, rather than reaching an
arbitrary cut-point. The categorical model suggested a core
of 61 websites with a periphery of 1,159 nodes and had a
model fit of 0.22. The one-mode continuous analysis was
conducted using the minres algorithm and a core of eight
nodes with 1,212 periphery nodes was suggested with amodel
fit of 0.07. Comparison between the categoricalmodel and the
continuous model demonstrated the categorical model was
a better fit for the data given the large differences between
the scores in model fit. Table 1 contains the top 8 websites as
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Table 2: Group densities between core and periphery across categorical and continuous models.
Categorical (Fit = 0.22) Core Periphery Continuous (Fit = 0.07) Core Periphery
Core 0.132 0.019 Core 0.250 0.160
Periphery 0.001 0.001 Periphery 0.001 0.001
Figure 1: Core-periphery categoricalmodel.Note: dark grey squares
represent core nodes; light grey squares represent periphery nodes.
ranked by the continuous model and their associated corene
scores.
Determining the variability of subject matter through
content analysis on all sixty-one core domains indicated by
the categorical model proved cumbersome, therefore only
the nodes present in both models were analyzed; this was
a limitation with the data capture which could be solved
by automated methods in future. Eight nodes from the
continuousmodelwere used to highlight the types ofwebsites
found within the core and it is important to note that these
eight nodes were identified as part of the core structures of
both models. The structural position of the core within the
network is shown in Figure 1. With the addition of more
attributes, the core 61 nodes could be assessed to determine
if there were any similarities between them. There may be a
correlation between domain membership and content, with
certain typologies more likely to exist in the core.
A content analysis of the core eight nodes was conducted
to determine if any particular type of website or content was
contributing to the core. The top eight nodes all appeared
to have similar domain structures (directory sites), while
the content varied between the sites. Notably, the website
with the highest corene score was offline when the content
analysis was conducted two months after data capture. While
the continuous model was not selected to represent the
network visually, the corene scores demonstrated which core
nodes were the most central to the network. The core is
represented by the dark grey squares, while the periphery
is represented by the light grey squares in Figure 1. Visually,
these 61 nodes, given their centralization and large number
of ties, represented what would be expected of a core as
demonstrated by their position in the network. The large
cluster of dark grey squares, shown centre left in Figure 1,
represented approximately 60% of the core. Many nodes
overlapped, which suggested they held a similar place within
the network and may be part of the same community.
4.2. Core-Periphery Analysis. Group densities were also com-
pared to determine the best model to use for the core-
periphery analysis and are shown in Table 2. These com-
parisons helped to identify how connected the core is to
itself and the periphery. If the core connections were not
above the network average it could have indicated the
model was a poor fit for the data. The density measured
the proportion of connections that existed as a ratio of all
possible connections available within the network [39]. In the
categorical model the core density was 0.132, as compared to
the overall network density of 0.002. The large discrepancy
indicated that there was in fact a core present within the
network. The density from the core to the periphery was .019
and from the periphery back to the core it was 0.001. The
connection of the core nodes to the peripheral nodes was low,
having only formed connections to 1.9% of possible nodes.
From periphery to periphery the density was also 0.001, less
than the total network. The peripheral connectivity was the
same for both the core and other peripheral nodes making
connections with only 1.16 nodes. The core nodes connected
to an average of eight other members of the core. The core
also connected, on average, to approximately 22 periphery
nodes.This was in comparison to the periphery which linked
to other peripheral nodes at just over one connection per
node. These large differences indicated that there was a core
present within this network and was consistent with other
online communities containing scale-free properties.
In the continuousmodel the core density was 0.25; mean-
ing 25% of all the possible ties between core members were
present. Each core node on average connected to at least two
other members in the core. The core to periphery was 0.16,
which was also quite large given that the periphery consisted
of 1,212 nodes. On average, the core nodes connected to 194
periphery nodes within the network. The periphery back
to the core was 0.001 and the periphery to the periphery
nodes remained the same at 0.001. While the continuous
model had amuchdenser core, the categoricalmodel retained
connectivity while including more nodes. This was ideal for
identifying the nodes that possessed a significant number of
the connections within the network. Adding the ties from all
dyadic pairs within the core, and ties from the core to the
periphery in the continuous model, 57% of all the ties in the
network were present. In the categorical model this rises to
66%, indicating that the core was responsible for almost two-
thirds of all present ties.
4.3. Network Structure. The fundamental assumption under-
lying a network using websites as nodes was that domains
can have social relationships or meaningful connections to
other websites [26].These assumed relationships suggest that
websites have properties that can be considered analogous
to the connections made by people. Websites at their core
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are still operated by users, so while this remains a possible
limitation, the hyperlinks are still chosen by individuals,
an action no different than choosing friendships offline.
Comparing networks across group typologies then should
be considered in this context, such as those containing child
exploitation materials [4, 30], terrorist networks [40], or
abstract structures [25, 32]. Domains hyperlinking to other
domains are a product of this decision-making process and
do not significantly differ fromhow edges are formed in other
contemporary groups in different contexts. In this study,
examining the network characteristics revealed that Tor
shared some similarities with these other observed networks.
Without an extensive meta-analysis of all network types, it
was impossible to place Tor into a specific category.
Comparing results across online networks can help to
clarify how online networks operate. For example, a compar-
ison of the cohesion measures indicated that the density of
0.002 found in the Tor network was lower than those found
in two regular Internet child exploitation networks (0.05
and 0.11, resp.) [30]. It is possible this observed difference
was due to network size; however, networks containing
CE materials may be the best comparison available due to
criminal domain saturation. Comparing the features of the
network to licit alternatives provides little benefit except to
simply say that Tor is in fact different.The average distance of
4.95 hops (the sum of all dyadic pairs between nodes) within
the Tor network is consistent with the literature regarding
online networks exhibiting small-world properties [32]. As
defined by Milgram, small-world properties are networks
with an average path length of six or less [41]. In addition to
containing properties associated with small-world networks
the Tor network also had features consistent with a power-law
distribution that defines scale-free networks [32]. This was
measured through the degree centralization score, which in
the Tor network was 42%; this was quite large and surpasses
other online networks [32, 42]. Although it was difficult to
speculate as to the exact network structure of Tor without
a more exhaustive review, the Tor network appeared to
share similar properties with other online networks although
definitively more centralized.
5. Discussion
5.1. Core-Periphery. The results of the core-periphery model
were consistent with the findings regarding the overall degree
centralization of the network. As noted above, the reported
degree centralization of 42% indicated the network contained
properties associatedwith a scale-free network: few hubswith
many connections. This indicated there were some parallel
attributes between the regular Internet and the dark web, as
both contained features of a scale-free network. A core of
61 nodes (or 5% of the network) was identified and had an
overall group density of 0.132. At 18.019, the core to periphery
densities were also larger than those of the overall network
(0.002). This core contingent accounted for a significant
portion of all ties in the network and connections to other
core nodes, indicating this data reduction technique may
be useful for examining the Tor network. Core-periphery
analysis works best in an environment that cannot be divided
reasonably into cohesive subgroups [39]. Without a dataset
containing attributes to interpret these subgroups or factions,
core-periphery allowed for the identification of a subset of
nodes containing a significant majority of the connections
[39]. The Internet was also typically considered to reflect a
core-periphery model as conceptualized by [34, 43] when
they describe how links are formed through specific network
paths, as opposed to random chance.These authors suggested
the Internet was inherently designed in such a way that
information travels along designated paths to form a core
[34]. The idea that new nodes within the network were more
likely to form connections with existing popular nodes. For
example, a newly registered domain will link to Google
at a significantly higher rate than cbc.ca. Again, the Tor
network appeared to operate in a similar manner, with
websites connected to a small number of central nodes
rather than similar peripheral websites. This demonstrated
that new nodes, or websites, were more likely to form
connections to older, more well-established websites than to
newer sites. New domains on Tor were more likely to link
to this centralized core than form connections to peripheral
nodes.This could be due to the relative anonymity associated
with domain creation within Tor, where users are simply
unaware of the other nodes’ existence. Either way it has
implications for law enforcement regarding authorship and
domain generation, nodes which connected outside of the
norm to more peripheral nodes may be authored or created
by the same individual.
The results also deviate from those found in relation to
an offline gang network [44], insofar as the current study
suggested a much denser core. The similarities between the
two types of networks both being elusive and illicit in nature
did not seem to link these structures. The core-periphery
analysis in the current model is more conducive to Internet-
based networks, suggesting that network topography plays a
larger role than network typology. Online networks may not
be comparable to offline networks despite the symmetries in
the content of those networks due to the scale-free nature of
online networks.Thepresence of overlapping nodes indicated
they belong to the same community on the network. This
finding suggested that connections between websites were
not driven by homogeneous characteristics and content. The
core-periphery analysis also suggested that connections on
the network are dispersed and cannot be tied into reasonably
cohesive subgroups. It was also more difficult to determine
any key members within the network – obfuscating the enti-
ties that produced the majority of illicit activity or content.
This made sense given the Tor network is employed by users
aiming to avoid detection by law enforcement.
The absence of homophily in the network structures also
showed that websites were dissimilar in content and that
ties were not created or limited by shared characteristics.
However, this can be seen as a benefit for Tor users. Forming
connectionswith dissimilar websites can increase embedded-
ness and the ability of users to operate without being tracked
ormonitored, a key objective of Tor users.These ties were also
more likely to dissolve, which may contribute to the transient
nature of the Tor network [29]. As social disorganization the-
ory suggests, the diversity of users can interfere with the Tor
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community’s ability to form relationships between users and
develop effective communication. Without communication,
surveillance of activities on the network is greatly inhibited
and dissimilarity between users can instead breed mistrust
among the community.Thus, the weak ties and heterogeneity
found within network communities lend credence to the
possible roles these characteristics have in fostering illicit
activity on the Tor network.
Online illicit networks provide an additional advantage
for individuals seeking to engage in malicious or illicit
activities as compared to offline illicit networks.Unlike offline
networks, websites do not need to spend costly resources
to maintain social capital and sustain relevancy within the
network. Thus, core membership was likely less intensive in
online networks, allowing these key sites to maintain their
structural positioning within the network. This was differ-
ent from offline networks where core-periphery structures
provided different network contexts. Larger cores allowed
the network to sustain its structure if users left, while larger
peripheries allowed more adaptability within networks [44].
For law enforcement removing nodes within a network
with a large core would have little disruption effect as the
pathways through the network are easily attained through
other avenues. Targeting of nodes for removal then should
not be based upon the principles of disruption or fragmen-
tation but instead should be aimed towards deterrence or
desistance where the impact would affect the largest number
of users possible. Cryptomarkets and large forums would
make ideal targets where users have made investments into
accounts whether financially or through gaining trust and
reputation. Additionally, dispersed cores are not impacted
when peripheral nodes continually enter and exit the net-
work. A single core node does not serve as the only linkage
between the cluster of peripheral nodes and the rest of
the network. Conversely, removing core nodes within larger
peripheries, as in the case of the current study where the core
is characterized by scale-free features, will have a substantially
larger impact on network traversal. For example, the targeted
law enforcement efforts on the “Silk Road” by the FBI saw
a large disruption effect for Tor users who were not simply
displaced to competing cryptomarkets [12].
In determining if the Tor network shared similar proper-
ties to the regular Internet, it is likely that the connections
between domains are formed using the same principles
[25]. Edge formation was not random and not all nodes
within the network have the same probabilities of forming
connections [25]. There was, to some degree, a form of
preferential selection taking place, where new nodes were
more likely to link back to these already established core
nodes.The encrypted nature of Tor means information is not
routed in exactly the same way, as data still travels through
a designated path. Core modeling of the regular Internet
further reinforced the use of this analysis in assessing these
models within a social network context [34]. The 61 core
nodes identified through the categorical model should be
compared further with attribute data to speculate about the
types of websites comprising this crucial component. The
results of the content analysis for the core eight domains
indicated that over half are primarily focused on supplying
hyperlinks to other domains on Tor. Due to the anonymity
and obscurity of Tor, it is likely these directory sites are
necessary for users to find content. If the dissemination of
information on Tor is reliant upon these directory sites to
such a large degree, it has implications for how crime occurs
within this context. Future research is necessary to assess
if directory sites are linking illegal or criminal websites to
other criminal sites or if these sites are forming their own
communities.
Following a power-law distribution, the network prop-
erties of Tor indicate that it is less likely to recover fol-
lowing domain failures of the hub nodes [25, 43]. Two
important considerations are that this leaves the network
vulnerable to attack from groups looking to disrupt the
network (law enforcement, hacktivists, governments, etc.) or
internal causes such as the lack of infrastructure may cause
significant disruptions to accessibility and network fluidity.
While removing one node remains a challenge and has shown
to be a costly endeavour by law enforcement [12], targeting of
a select few nodes representing the core structure may have
larger and more impactful disruption effects than focusing
on the criminal activities within a single domain. The core
structure will also regulate how new users can move from
domain to domain on Tor likely having to pass through
a hub before specific URLs are identified. A hub which is
offline for a significant amount of time may vastly restrict
the access of users to content which may funnel them into
following a different path. Consider the example of a user
looking to purchase a firearm in the context of the results.
They download the Tor browser and follow the steps and find
the Hidden Wiki. This domain has links to a few domains
which reportedly sell firearms; however the links are dead or
broken.Theperson decides to try one of themarketplaces and
see if someone is selling there. On the marketplace someone
may be advertising a different domain which sells firearms
because it may go against the policies of the marketplace.The
person then follows the hyperlink to the final domain and is
able to purchase the gun. Alternatively, in a less centralized
network, the domain which sells firearms may be directly
hyperlinked by many websites and is accessible by simply
clicking it directly from theHiddenWiki.The addition of one
domain does not seem like a preventative factor in stopping a
motivated user from purchasing the firearm but due to the
factors listed above may be critical. The user needs to find
the content on the marketplace, law enforcement has another
avenue for intervention and both need to remain stable long
enough for this user to make the critical leaps.
6. Conclusions
The Tor network is a relatively unknown and unexplored
region of the dark web allowing users to anonymously
communicate and browse content through encrypted means.
Past research has speculated on the content of Tor through
limited studies focused on small sections of the network [5, 7].
A more thorough and systematic process was necessary to
conduct analysis of the Tor network. In the current study,
an automated tool was used to collect data and social net-
work analysis was applied to examine how websites formed
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connections through hyperlinks to other websites. This type
of analysis adds a further dimension to how users access
content on Tor.
The results of the social network analysis provided insight
into the characteristics of the virtual communities formed
through hyperlink connections. Support for a homophily
effect regarding the way Tor nodes were connecting to others
within the network was found. This was also supported
by the notion that the Tor nodes had, on average, more
incoming ties than the link sites. The core-periphery model
identified the main 61 central nodes within the network and
guide users through this dark network. Although there was
a slight homophily effect regarding the core nodes, websites
within the networks appeared to be largely composed of
heterophilous connections. As such, similar content did not
appear to be the driving force connecting websites. Reference
[4] found a similar finding when analyzing online child
exploitation communities and suggested that connections
with similar content may have a negative impact; similar
connected websites may experience decreased traffic to their
domains as users can access the information on competitor’s
sites. When considered under a social disorganization per-
spective, it is also probable that dissimilar and heterogeneous
connections are contributing to the Tor community’s inability
to effectively surveil deviant users and activity.
Social disorganization principles can provide insight into
how network structures may foster illicit activity on Tor. The
sparse online networks appear to share similar characteristics
to real world crime-prone neighborhoods; they are largely
composed of weak and heterophilous ties between domains.
Although it was not specifically examined in this current
study, Tor is also known for its inherently transient nature;
a vast number of domains are created and taken down on
a daily basis. Such instability may amplify the facilitation
of illicit activity; users specifically choose to operate on
Tor and other dark webs to avoid detection and obfuscate
their activities. The extension of a criminological theory and
concepts should be further explicated to understand how
dark web community structures could be fostering illicit
activity. The integration of criminology theory is useful to
the extent that it can potentially help inform police strategies
and reduce criminal activity by targeting formed network
communities. Further, it would be advantageous to take a
later sample of the data to determine if the characteristics of
Tor network structures remain consistent. Due to the sheer
volume and size of Tor, measuring change over time within
the network structures is needed to refine and corroborate
our findings.
As the data was not collected through a randomized
sample and may be reflective of the seed websites, the results
are not without limitations. For example, if the seed websites
were entirely focused on drug markets, without attribute
data it would not be possible to tell if the entire sample
consists of drug relatedwebsites.The seed sitesmay be biasing
the sample based upon content rather than overall network
position. The lack of attribute data hampers the ability of
the data to be generalizable to a broader sample without
first examining what types of websites were collected. Future
research should include as many attributes as possible from
each website such as content, legality, page views, visitors,
registered users, and Bitcoin wallets to allow comparison
between the network measures and website characteristics
as was previously done in child exploitation research [4].
The attributes would also allow for community detection
to be used to examine how these websites were grouping
together to form connections. The core-periphery analysis
used in the study examined only one set of these communities
and it is likely that many others exist. Moreover, applying
criminological concepts and measures to the online realm
has many challenges and this study did not empirically
test social disorganization theory or examine how other
structural factors can mediate or influence the relationship
between communities and crime [23].
Dark web networks have received significant attention in
the past decade, in both the public and political realm, and are
being viewed as the only way to protect one’s information and
privacy in a world where the collection and flow of personal
data are nearly inescapable for Internet users. It remains an
important task for researchers and law enforcement to pursue
a further understanding of how these networks are exploited
by individuals and entities for criminal purposes, as this may
better inform strategies to disrupt illicit activities on Tor
and other dark webs. By understanding the characteristics
that foster criminal structures on the network, this could
aid enforcement in targeting malicious users and removing
illicit content. Still, only a portion of the Tor network was
explored in this study, leaving a significant portion still in
the dark. Employing social network analysis to examinemore
domains and the networks they form will allow for a better
picture of how users are traversing the Tor network and can
better indicate whether social disorganization principles can
provide an understanding of crime on Tor.
Appendix
In the seed data collection 1000 domains were found using
Google, Reddit, and the Hidden Wiki. Of which 150 were
selected using a random number generator to seed the
crawler to start the data collection period. This was done to
eliminate potential selection bias where if a core structure
was identified it would simply represent the seeds chosen.
If the core was made up of primarily seed domains the
network structure would more accurately represent the ego
networks of the seeds rather than a representative sample
of the Tor network as a whole. The results of a QAP
regression (UCINet 6 v. 6.644) showed that (𝑅2 = 0.13)
seed domains did not significantly predict core membership
(exp(𝐵) = 1.05, 𝑝 > .05); however, seed domains did have
significantly greater indegree (exp(𝐵) = 0.31, 𝑝 < .001)
and average geodesic distances (exp(𝐵) = 0.13, 𝑝 < .01).
The crawler recursively followed found hyperlinks on each
collected webpage subsequently stored in a queue. Awebpage
was scraped and the XML document which comprises the
underlying structure of the webpage was stored in the crawler
database. The webpage could then be viewed offline from
the database and visually verified by a researcher at a later
date for content analysis. Data collection could be terminated
by manually cancelling the TDC after a certain time period
Security and Communication Networks 11
or by specifying a criterion. For this study TDC ran until
it had collected 1 million webpages and lasted ∼90 days or
3 months. The 1 million webpages comprise 1,220 unique
domains. Each hyperlink found on a webpage then was
collapsed into representing a specific domain. If a hyperlink
was found on page 1 or page 820 (the mean number of
webpages per website) of Website A both represented a tie
to Website B and C and was coded as such. The hyperlinks
were then aggregated for each domain and used to generate
the networks.
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